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AbstractʊIn this paper, four practical and successful 
deregulated electricity markets: the old England & Wales Pool, 
the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA), Nordic Pool and PJM interconnection will be briefly 
explained and discussed on their histories, structures, rules and 
also advantages and disadvantages. The old England & Wales 
Pool was a typical Pool type market which was one of the first 
successful electricity market deregulations but now had been 
replaced by the BETTA which is based on the bilateral and 
balancing mechanism. Nordic Pool and PJM are hybrid markets 
which combine both pool and bilateral principles. With 
maturing deregulated mechanism, transmission congestion 
becomes an urgent problem for all markets. Uniform marginal 
price, locational marginal price and zonal price are three typical 
methods in Pool and Hybrid market for congestion management. 
Locational marginal price is regarded as more efficient than 
other two when it comes to the market power dilution. In 
bilateral market, four transaction curtailments based on four 
rules: first come first serve, pro rata, minimum-net curtailment 
and price based are utilized to relieve congestion.  
Index Terms-- Deregulated Electricity Market, Transmission 
Congestion Management, Uniform Marginal Price, Locational 
Marginal Price, Zonal Price and transaction curtailment.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1980s, many countries started to unbundle their 
vertically integrated power utility to a competitive market 
environment because of the new requirements for energy 
industry such as reducing the cost, improving efficiency and 
maintaining the long-term development [1]. People believe 
that with the introduction of competition, liberalized 
electricity market will theoretically enable to satisfy the 
above requirements thus electricity price could get close to 
the marginal cost of generation, companies will minimize 
their production cost and customers could get a cheaper price 
for electricity [2]. The objective of energy industry restructure 
is to create a competitive environment for electricity trading 
in order to improve social welfare [3].  
In the deregulated electricity market, transmission 
congestion is the major issue which could causes power 
system crisis. In old power structure, the system operator 
(SO) only needs to re-dispatch the generation schedule until 
the congestion has been released. However, with the 
deregulation process, congestion management becomes more 
complex since transmission network has to be opened to all 
market participants [4].  
This paper introduces four typical worldwide electricity 
markets and their respectively transmission congestion 
management schemes.  
 
II. GLOBAL EXPERIENCE OF COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS 
A. UK 
 The old England & Wales Pool 
On 31st March 1990, electricity industry in England and 
Wales started to be restructured with new mechanism [5]. 
After deregulation, the dominated vertically integrated 
industry Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in 
England and Wales had been split into three generating 
companies: National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric 
[5]; one transmission company: the National Grid Company 
and 12 regional electricity companies (RECs) which were 
regarded as local distribution systems [1]. An electricity pool 
market had been established which arranged and managed 
electricity trades in England and Wales with wholesale 
market mechanism. Figure 1 shows the structure of electricity 
industry at privatization [5].  
 
Fig. 1.  The Structure of Electricity Industry in England & Wales. 
 
The old England & Wales Pool is a typical mandatory pool 
market which means every energy trade has to be transacted 
only inside the pool market [2]. By 10 a.m. each day, 
generation companies should send generation output quantity 
for the following day and bid price of electricity provided on 
the following day to the SO, here is the National Grid 
Company, who already forecasted the power demand quantity 
 in each half hour period [1]. Then the SO will start to accept 
bids from the cheapest price to higher price until the 
forecasted demand is satisfied. Then, the SO will sort out a 
bids list which contains names of the generation companies 
who have been chosen to generate electricity on the following 
day. Those generation companies were called in merit 
generation companies which means their bids have been 
accepted by the SO and those who have not been accepted by 
the SO were called out of merit generation companies [2]. 
At last, the SO will set prices for all pool market participants. 
System Marginal Price (SMP) is the price which bidden by 
the most expensive generation company in the bids list [1]. In 
the pool market, the SO will pay for the Pool Purchase Price 
(PPP) to all the in merit generation companies. The Pool 
Purchase Price (PPP) is the System Marginal Price (SMP) 
plus Capacity Payment (CP) which is defined with Loss of 
Load Probability (LOLP) and Value of Loss Load (VOLL) 
[1]. On the other side, suppliers will pay for the price called 
Pool Selling Price (PSP) to purchase the electricity power 
from the pool [1]. The PSP is the PPP plus the Uplifts. The 
following equations defined the relationships between those 
prices [6]: 
 
 ܲܲܲ ൌ ܵܯܲ ൅ ܥܲ (1) 
 ܥܲ ൌ ܮܱܮܲ ൈ݉ܽݔሺ	?ǡ ܸܱܮܮ െ ܵܯܲሻ (2) 
 ܲܵܲ ൌ ܲܲܲ ൅ ܷ݌݈݂݅ݐݏ (3) 
 
CP is an incentive which is used to reward the generation 
companies who declare that their capacity is available 
regardless of whether they are required to or not. LOLP is the 
probability that electricity power capacity is unable to support 
the actual demand. LOLP is predicted in each half hour. 
The pool structure is regarded as an innovation for energy 
industry deregulation [5]. However, electricity price decrease 
is slower than generator cost reduction and customers are 
unable to access to the deregulation benefits. The biggest 
reason is that three dominant generation companies exercise 
their market power and determine price most of the time [7].  
 
 The British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements (BETTA) 
On 27th March 2001, the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA) was introduced to replace the pool 
with the concept that markets participants have rights to 
transact electricity power by bilateral trading [5]. On 1st April 
2005, with the joining of Scottish network, the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) has been extended 
as the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements (BETTA) [5]. In the BETTA, electricity 
participants are able to trade by bilateral contracts. The bulk 
of electricity power is traded by Forward/Future contracts and 
short-term power exchange [8]. The Forward/Future contracts 
could be signed ahead of days, months or even years before 
actual power delivery [1]. The short-term power exchange is 
within 24 hours before electricity delivery which offers 
market participants an opportunity to adjust their contract 
details. Market participants are required to notify their 
predicted physical information in each half hour period, for 
seller is the planned generation output and for buyer is the 
metered demand, by 11 a.m. one day ahead. This information 
is called initial physical notifications (IPNs) [5]. Then market 
participants will hand in their final physical notifications 
(FPNs) to the SO before the gate closure, usually 3.5 hours 
before delivery [5]. Figure 2 show the structure of BETTA [5] 
and figure 3 shows the diagrammatic representation of 
BETTA time frame process [2]: 
 
 
Fig. 2.  The Structure of the BETTA 
 
 
Fig. 3.  The Diagrammatic Representation of BETTA Time Frame Process 
 
Apart from physical data, participants have an opportunity 
to submit their offers and bids to the SO to take part in 
balancing mechanism which is on a voluntary basis [8]. The 
SO collects offers and bids then matches the balance between 
supply and demand so that system security is able to be 
ensured. After offers and bids have been accepted by the SO, 
market participants will be paid or charged according to their 
contracted prices. The SO will punish the participant who 
violates the contract.   
Because more price information is available, bilateral 
market provides more liquidity so that electricity price 
decreases remarkable [8]. However, in order to avoid penalty 
from the SO, generators would increase output whilst 
suppliers would reduce demand which will make inefficient 
elements arise. Another problem is that renewable generation 
is unable to guarantee the production accurately so it will be 
easier penalized than other generations [8].    
 B. Nordic Countries 
The Nordic electricity market is consisted of four markets 
from four countries: Sweden, Norway, Finland and Demark. 
In 1996, Sweden and Norway joined together and established 
the Norwegian-Swedish Exchange called as Nord pool which 
is the initial state of the current Nord pool [9]. Four years 
later, with Finland and Demark joining, a new integrated 
regulatory framework for electricity industry competition 
across Nordic countries was established which was also the 
first multinational electricity market.  
The Nord Pool is consisted of two physical markets and 
several financial markets [10]. Figure 4 shows Nordic 
markets components [10]; Figure 5 shows the diagrammatic 
representation of Nord pool time frame process [2]: 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Nordic Market Components  
 
 
Fig. 5.  The Diagrammatic Representation of Nord Pool Time Frame Process 
 
Elspot market is referred as the main physical market 
which is a day-ahead market arranging hourly bilateral 
contracts. It will determine the hourly spot price which will 
be regarded as the reference price both for financial and 
physical market. About one thirds of electricity consumption 
was traded in Elspot market and the rest of transactions were 
taken place through bilateral contacts [10]. Elbas was seemed 
as a supplement of Elspot market for additional balancing 
services. It offers participants an opportunity to adjust their 
physical power position such as the price and volume of 
supply or demand within two hours period. There are two 
financial markets in Nord Pool including Eltermin and 
Eloption. Sellers and buyers can sign a forward and future 
contract in Eltermin market days, weeks, months and even up 
to four years ahead to hedge against the prices volatility risk. 
Eloption market is quite a new financial market which also 
provides contract services. The Nord Pool also allows brokers 
to organise the over the counter (OTC) trading for market 
participants to make bilateral contracts [2]. The Nord Pool 
power exchange is the key point of Nordic electricity market.       
System price is determined in spot market [11]. When 
transmission network capacity is sufficient, the wholesale 
electricity prices in four countries are the same. Once 
transmission capacity shortage takes place, prices in different 
areas will be different. Norway will divide into several price 
areas; Sweden and Demark have two areas respectively; 
while Finland only has one area [10].  
Sufficient hydropower and low demand make Nordic 
market a nearly wonderful power system [11]. Four electricity 
markets definitely dilute the market power [11] but due to 
congestion there are still chances for participants to exercise 
tricky games [2].  
C. PJM Interconnection, US 
PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission 
organization (RTO) in the United States [12]. It is serving the 
area of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland and other states 
in the eastern part of United States [13]. PJM is the biggest 
electricity wholesale market in the world which serves 61 
million of customers and has 900 participant power 
companies. PJM has an energy market which is consisted of a 
day-ahead market and a real-time balancing market; a 
capacity credit market; a financial transmission right (FTR) 
auction market and an ancillary service market which is 
consisted of a regulation market and a pin reserve market 
[12]. Figure 6 shows PJM market components [12]: 
 
 
Fig. 6.  PJM Components  
 
The day-ahead market calculates the hourly clearing prices 
for each hour of the next operating day based on generators 
offers, demand bids, virtual supply offers, virtual demand 
bids and bilateral transaction schedules and those data will be 
submitted into the day-ahead market voluntarily [13]. The 
balancing market calculates the clearing price in every 5 
minutes period with the principle of actual system operation 
and security constrained economic dispatch. Different 
settlement methods are adopted in two markets [13]. The day-
ahead market settlement follows the planned hourly power 
quantities and day-ahead hourly electricity prices. The 
balancing market settlement follows the hourly quantity 
deviations between planned values and real-time values. Both 
prices calculation are based on the mechanism of Locational 
Marginal Pricing (LMPs). The day-ahead market allows 
participants to exchange electricity at binding day-head 
prices. Participants can schedule bilateral transactions at 
binding day-ahead congestion price which is the price 
difference between source and sink. In the day-ahead market, 
generators who joined an installed capacity contract should 
 hand in their offer schedules even if they are self-scheduled 
and during outage. Participants should submit bilateral 
transaction schedules to the SO to notify whether they are 
willing to pay congestion charges and be curtailed if 
transmission congestion occurs. As the day-ahead market 
closing, the SO starts to make the schedule and dispatch for 
each hour of the next operating day.  
The real-time energy market is based on the real-time 
operation which is described by state estimator with the data 
from generation offers and transactions [13]. The generation 
rebidding period from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. is introduced for the 
generators who are not selected into day-ahead market 
schedules to alter their bids. Generators who produce more 
than scheduled quantities will be paid by real-time LMPs. For 
customers who consume the power volume more than the 
planned quantities will be charged by real-time LMPs. If 
participants who exchange spot energy, their trades will be 
settled at real-time LMPs. Besides the day-ahead market and 
the real-time balancing market, PJM also provides financial 
instruments for participants to hedge the price variation risks.  
PJM can provide market liquidity and price transparency. 
Efficient and sufficient price signals help market participants 
to make correct judgement.   
 
III. GENERIC CONGESTION MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
A. Uniform Marginal Price 
Uniform Marginal Price was implemented in the former 
England & Wales Pool. It indicates electricity prices in the 
market will be identical for all participants without 
considering the locations [2]. The SO adopts the principle 
referred as re-dispatch first, compensate later to manage 
transmission congestion [6]. In dispatch stage, system 
operator collects all the generators bids and ranks them from 
cheapest to higher prices until demand has been satisfied. The 
highest price becomes the market clearing price which is also 
called the system marginal price and the most expensive 
generator becomes the marginal generator. When 
transmission congestion occurred, the SO will re-dispatch the 
generators list, at the meantime ensuring the re-dispatch cost 
is the minimum. The algorithm of dispatch is shown as [6]:  
 
 ݉݅݊ 	? ܥீ೔ሺܲீ ೔ሻேಸ௜ୀଵ  (4) 
Subject to: 
 	? ܲீ ೔ ൌேಸ௜ୀଵ 	? ௅ܲೕேಽ௝ୀଵ  (5) 
 	 ? ൑ ܲீ೔ ൑ ܲீ ೔௠௔௫ (6) 
Where: ܥீ೔ሺܲீ ೔ሻ is the bid-based generation is cost of generator i ܲீ ೔  is the generator i power generation  ௅ܲೕ  is the demand prediction ீܰ is the total number of generators ௅ܰ is the total number of loads ܲீ ೔௠௔௫ is the generator i maximum capacity 
 
If congestion occurs, an inequality constraint will be added 
[6]: 
 ௟ܲ௜௡௘ೖ ൑ ௟ܲ௜௡௘ೖ௠௔௫  (7) 
Where: ௟ܲ௜௡௘ೖ is the power flow on the line k ௟ܲ௜௡௘ೖ௠௔௫  is the power flow up limitation of line k 
 
Re-dispatched schedule is decided by the new algorithm. 
The chosen generators are called constrained on generators 
which were out-of-merit generators but is on the new 
generation list and those failed to be chosen ones are called 
constrained off generators but they were in-merit generators 
[2]. All on-list generators will be paid by PPP and also be 
compensated by an adjustment payment for the difference 
between their bid prices and the PPP. All customers will pay 
for PSP plus Uplift. 
In this method, electricity trading price barely reflect the 
congestion cost. The SO allocates congestion cost equally on 
participants without considering power flow contribution. 
Uniform price is unable to provide investment incentives for 
long-term development.  
B. Locational Marginal Price 
Locational marginal price is the primary pricing scheme in 
the United States electricity markets for electricity price 
calculations and congestion management. Before calculate the 
LMP, the SO uses optimal power flow (OPF) to calculate 
dispatch of each generator [14]. OPF is the integration of 
power flow calculation and minimization of economic 
objective function subject to the equality and inequality 
constraints. As known, power injected into all nodes is equal 
to power withdrawn plus transmission losses which can be 
written as [2]: 
 െ 	? ௜ܲ௚ே௜ୀଵ ൅ 	? ௜ܲௗே௜ୀଵ ൅ ௟ܲ௢௦௦ ൌ 	 ? (8) 
Where: ௟ܲ௢௦௦ is the transmission losses in the power system 	? ௜ܲ௚ே௜ୀଵ  is the sum real power generated from node i 	? ௜ܲௗே௜ୀଵ  is the sum real power demand at node i 
 
Based on the equation (8), the the corresponding 
Lagrangian equation can be defined as follows [15]: 
 
 ࣦ ൌ 	? ܥ௜ே௜ୀଵ ൫ ௜ܲ௚൯ ൅ ߣ଴൫െ 	? ௜ܲ௚ே௜ୀଵ ൅ 	? ௜ܲௗே௜ୀଵ ൅ ௟ܲ௢௦௦൯ ൅	? ߤ௟௅௟ୀଵ ሺȁ ௟ܲȁ െ ௟ܲ௠௔௫ሻ ൅ 	? ߨ௜௠௔௫ே௜ୀଵ ൫ ௜ܲ௚ െ ௜ܲǡ௠௔௫௚ ൯ ൅	? ߨ௜௠௜௡ே௜ୀଵ ሺ ௜ܲǡ௠௜௡௚ െ ௜ܲ௚ሻ                                                        (9) 
 
Where: ߣ଴ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the whole systems power 
balance constraint  
N is the total number of nodes 
L is the total number of transmission lines ߤ௟ is the Lagrangian multiplier of transmission line constraint  ߨ௜௠௔௫ and ߨ௜௠௜௡ are the Lagrangian multipliers of maximum 
and minimum generation capacity of generator i 
 
Based on the equation (9), equation of LMP of node i can 
be obtained as follow [2]: 
 
  ܮܯ ௜ܲ ൌ డࣦడ௉೔೏ ൌ ߣ଴ ൬	? ൅డ௉೗೚ೞೞడ௉೔೏ ൰ ൅ 	? ߤ௟௅௟ୀଵ ൈ డ௉೗డ௉೔೏ ൌ ߣ଴ ൅ ߣ଴ ൈ൬డ௉೗೚ೞೞడ௉೔೏ ൰ ൅ 	? ߤ௟௅௟ୀଵ ൈ ௜ܶିଵ                                                      
(10) 
 
Where: ௜ܶିଵ is the sensitivity factor for real power at node i with line 
l constraint 
 
LMP in node i can be divided into three components as 
follows [16]: 
 
 ܮܯ ௜ܲ ൌ ܮܯ ௜ܲ௘௡௘௥௚௬ ൅ ܮܯ ௜ܲ௖௢௡௚௘௧௜௢௡ ൅ ܮܯ ௜ܲ௟௢௦௦     
(11) 
Where: ܮܯ ௜ܲ௘௡௘௥௚௬ ൌ ߣ଴ is the system marginal cost of node i ܮܯ ௜ܲ௖௢௡௚௘௦௧௜௢௡ ൌ ߣ଴ ൈ ሺడ௉೗೚ೞೞడ௉೔೏ ሻ  is the cost of transmission 
congestion of node i ܮܯ ௜ܲ௟௢௦௦ ൌ 	? ߤ௟௅௟ୀଵ ൈ ௜ܶିଵ is the cost of transmission losses 
of node i 
 
If there is no congestion and transmission loss, LMPs of 
each node will be the same which is set as the system 
marginal price. When congestion happens, LMPs between 
different nodes will become distinct due to transmission lost 
and congestion [14]. At one node, generator will be paid from 
LMPs and customer will pay for the LMPs and both actions 
will be implemented by the SO. 
LMP system is transparent so that correct incentives and 
guidance for industry investment in particular zone can be 
provided. But pricing scheme is bid-based rather than cost-
based so that generators would still try to exercise market 
power. The SO can collect congestion revenue which will 
increase the possibility of market inefficiency [2].  
C. Zonal Price 
Zonal price simplifies the LMP which is a complex 
approach [17]. The SO splits the whole system into zones 
depending on historical data and economic operation of each 
node. Figure 7 shows the process [2]: 
 
Fig. 7.  Multi-nodes system split into three zones when congestion occurs 
 
When there is no congestion, electricity prices in each node 
will be identical to the system marginal price which is 
calculated based on the bids collected from market 
participants. Once transmission congestion occurs, the whole 
system will be divided into different zones which were 
defined in advance. Inside a zone, electricity price is uniform 
which is calculated based on the bids from participants inside 
the zone.  
From figure 7, node 1, 2, 3, node 4, 5, 6 and node 7, 8, 9 
are respectively composed into three single zones. The 
transmission line between node 2 and node 4 now becomes 
the only connection which links zone 1 and zone 2 named 
Tie-line [2]. Zonal Price is actually the combination of the 
Uniform Marginal Price and the LMPs [18]. Inside each zone 
all nodal prices are identical which is similar with the 
Uniform Marginal Price. Each zone can be regarded as a 
big node which has its own electricity price priced by 
LMPs.   
Zonal price may simplify the complex process of LMP 
while it is hard to define zone boundaries because it only 
considers the assumption that congestion inside zone is 
infrequent [2]. As a result, intra-zonal congestion problems 
are ignored easily by priced on average cost while it still 
exists [1].  Zonal price uses an invalid assumption to meet 
reality which brings chances for participants inside a zone to 
play games [18].   
D. Transaction Curtailments 
In bilateral market like BETTA, in order to ensure the 
security of power system operation, the SO will curtail 
transactions in order to reduce the power flow on the 
transmission branch. With different superposition models, 
transaction curtailment can be based on four rules [6]: 
 
 First Come First Serve: 
The SO will make generation schedule based on first 
come first serve principle. The last submitted transaction 
will be rigidly curtailed first without considering the power 
flow contribution on transmission network. If it is unable to 
relieve congestion, the second last submitted transaction will 
be the target and then one by one until congestion solved.  
This method is rigid and didn't take power flow 
contribution into consideration [2]. Sometimes it is unable to 
relieve transmission congestion.  
 
 Pro Rata (Proportional): 
In this approach, the SO will curtail the power transaction 
volume proportionally based on the power flow contribution 
of each market participant. Market participant, who occupies 
transmission capacity more, will be curtailed more, vice versa 
[2].  
Process of this method is fair and transparent.  
 
 Minimum-net Curtailment: 
This method is aim to restrict the curtailment volume to the 
minimum. Since different transaction curtailment has 
different power flow sensitivities to any line flow, curtail one 
certain transaction is much more effective than other 
transaction curtailment [6]. The SO is focus on searching 
such bilateral transaction to avoid waste curtailment. 
 This process is transparent but not a market-based method 
so that it cannot provide incentives for industry investment 
[2] 
 
 Price Based 
1. Compensative Price 
In bilateral market, no participant wants their contracts to 
be curtailed. If the curtailment is unavoidable, they want to 
receive compensation. In this method, participants are 
required to submit a compensation price at the money per 
MW that the SO pays to compensate curtailed transaction and 
will also be accepted by both generator and load [6]. When 
congestion occurs, the SO will curtail the lowest 
compensation price transaction in order to minimize the total 
cost of curtailment.  
 
2. Willingness to Pay 
In this method, markets participants are required to submit 
a price which describes how much they will pay for to avoid 
their transaction being curtailed. Of course, transaction from 
the participant who didn't submit the price or bid at the lowest 
price will be curtailed firstly by the SO [6].  
This method doesn't consider the flow sensitivity and 
transmission contribution so it cannot be utilized alone [2]. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this article, four typical and successful deregulated 
electricity markets the old England & Wales Pool, BETTA, 
Nordic Pool and PJM have been explained in details. Facts 
have proved that many countries around the world are 
working on liberalizing their electricity markets in order to 
achieve new requirements for power energy industry. 
However, with maturing competitive environment, issues 
which were easy to solved become complex, for example, 
transmission congestion. As a consequence, each market 
attempts to find approaches to relieve congestion based on 
their respective market rules and conditions. Hence, uniform 
marginal price in E&W Pool, LMPs in PJM, zonal price in 
Nordic Pool and transaction curtailments in BETTA have 
been developed and adopted to manage congestion problems. 
But there is no perfect congestion management scheme and 
each method has its drawback. In bilateral market, transaction 
curtailments have different mechanisms and also different 
shortages such as causing extra cost for market participants, 
considering not comprehensive, providing no incentives and 
so on. In Pool and Hybrid market, LMP is obviously more 
effective than uniform price because it provides more 
economic information to participants and stronger incentives 
for long-term investments. Compared with Zonal price, LMP 
is still a wiser method for congestion relief because when it 
comes to market power LMPs performance seems to be more 
effective [19]. 
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